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The Internet presents some unique challenges for personal jurisdiction. 
People are able to post material on the Internet that is instantly available 
worldwide. This has many wonderful applications, but it also means a sin-
gle person who never leaves home can inflict significant harms on people 
around the world. 1 Moreover, because the Internet brings together people 
from parts of the world that have very different social policies concerning 
areas such as free speech, consumer protection, and intellectual property, 
there is a significant potential for conflict about underlying regulatory pol-
tcy. 
The international community has been struggling with questions of 
who should regulate the Internet and how, but little consensus has emerged. 
Some observers believe that disagreements over jurisdiction related to e-
commerce were largely responsible for the demise of the Hague Convention 
of Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters.2 For the United States, consideration of 
the pros and cons of the alternative jurisdictional approaches to e-commerce 
and cyberspace is complicated by an overlay of constitutionallaw.3 While 
the rest of the world considers the policy implications of a country of origin 
• Associate Dean for the J.D. Program and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I 
would like to extend a special thanks to Richard Freer for his helpful comments. Thanks also go to my 
research assistants, Ann Nash and Amber Smith, for their valuable research. 
1 See John Eisinger, Note, Script Kiddies Beware: The Long Arm of U.S. Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 
59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1507, 1508-09 (2002). 
2 Avril Haines, Why Is It So Difficult To Construct an International Legal Framework for £-
Commerce? The Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: A Case Study, 3 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 157, !53-
55, 171-73 (2002). 
3 One commentator has observed that "the American idea, so dominant ever since Pennoyer v. Neff, 
that the limits of a court's jurisdiction are largely a matter of constitutional rights seems rather fantastic 
to a European lawyer." MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE 
THROUGH THE JUNGLE 67 (I 995). 
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versus a country of destination approach,4 the United States is wrestling 
with what constitutes "purposeful availment" under the Due Process 
Clause. 
Looking at the constraints imposed by our constitutional doctrine of 
personal jurisdiction, Professor Redish has argued that this doctrine is ill-
suited to Internet cases and that we should abandon it for those cases. 5 I 
share Professor Redish's dissatisfaction with the constitutional requirement 
of purposeful availment. However, in this Article, I explore the issue from 
a different angle. I believe that the most difficult issues arise from the in-
ternational arena and may ultimately lead Congress to weigh in (as it has in 
the case of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act).6 As a result, 
this Article examines what limits the Fifth Amendment imposes on the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over aliens by the United States.7 
The Supreme Court has never squarely considered what limits the Fifth 
Amendment imposes on assertions of personal jurisdiction in federal court. 
Commentators have, for the most part, assumed that the limits imposed by 
the Fifth Amendment are comparable to those imposed on the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This Article examines that assumption and con-
cludes that the limits imposed by the Fifth Amendment are not comparable 
to those imposed by the Fourteenth. Specifically, it argues that the Fifth 
Amendment should not be understood to include the requirement of pur-
poseful availment8 and that jurisdiction should be constitutional on the basis 
of effects in the United States. 
This Article first considers the Fourteenth Amendment cases and ar-
gues that the constitutional limits on the jurisdictional authority of state 
courts reflect a view about the limits of state authority. It then turns to the 
Fifth Amendment and, after considering the practices of other nations and 
lessons from prescriptive jurisdiction, argues that the United States's sover-
eign authority should allow it to assert personal jurisdiction solely on the 
basis of effects in the United States, without a requirement of "purposeful 
availment." It further argues that concerns about reasonableness should be 
addressed at the subconstitutionallevel. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 54-56. 
5 Martin Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet, and the Nature 
of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575 (1998). 
6 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West Supp. 2003); see infra note 99. 
7 The focus ofthis Article is on jurisdiction over non-U.S. defendants. United States courts will al-
ways have jurisdiction over U.S. defendants, even applying the standards developed under the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Milliken v. Myer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
8 My focus is exclusively on the Fifth Amendment. This Article takes no position on the proper 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also does not consider whether the federal government can alter 
the jurisdictional powers of the states by treaty or statute. For a discussion of the treaty issue, see Pat-
rick Borchers, Judgments Conventions and Minimum Contacts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1161 (1998); Stanley 
Cox, Why Properly Construed Due Process Limits on Personal Jurisdiction Must Always Trump Con-
trary Treaty Provisions, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1177 (1998). 
456 
98:455 (2004) Aliens, the Internet, and "Purposeful Availment" 
This Article is built on two basic premises: that personal jurisdiction is 
a doctrine that concerns the allocation of sovereign authority, and that the 
underlying sovereignty considerations of the United States within the world 
community are quite different from those of the states within our confedera-
tion of states. As a result, although the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments are worded the same, the limitations that those 
clauses impose on sovereign authority are different. 
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AS AN ALLOCATION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
A. Sovereignty and the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has had a great deal to say about constitutional 
limits on personal jurisdiction, though nearly all of its cases have focused 
on the limits imposed on states under the Fourteenth Amendment. These 
Fourteenth Amendment cases highlight that personal jurisdiction is a doc-
trine that allocates sovereignty. The modern case that most clearly deline-
ates the Court's understanding of personal jurisdiction is World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson.9 There, the Court held that the fact of an injury in 
the forum, even a foreseeable injury, is not a sufficient basis for a state to 
assert jurisdiction.10 Instead, the Court held that the defendant must have 
purposeful contacts with the forum.'' In explaining this result, the Court 
stated that "the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant 
must be assessed 'in the context of our federal system of government. "'12 
The Court further explained: 
the Framers ... intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sov-
ereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their 
courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sov-
ereignty of all of its sister States-a limitation express or implicit in both the 
original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth AmendmentY 
World-Wide Volkswagen reinforces two critical points: first, that personal 
jurisdiction limits are based on a view about the limits of state sover-
eignty; 14 and second, that purposeful availment is the correct measure of 
state sovereignty within our federal system. It is important to differentiate 
between these two propositions because one can readily accept the first 
while rejecting the second. 
9 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
10 !d. at 295. 
11 !d. at 297. 
12 /d. at 293-94 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). 
13 !d. at 293. 
14 As Professor Stein has observed, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction is inescapably political because it is tied 
to a power allocation between sovereigns." Allan Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in 
the Law of Persona/Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 692 (1987). 
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The suggestion that the limits of personal jurisdiction reflect an under-
standing of the limits of sovereign authority did not originate with the 
World- Wide Volkswagen Court. This understanding of personal jurisdiction 
is apparent in Pennoyer v. Nefj.l 5 Justice Field's analysis of personal juris-
diction is explicitly grounded in his understanding of the relationship 
among the states. Relying on what he calls ''well established principles of 
public law,"16 and citing both Story's treatise on conflict of laws and Whea-
ton's treatise on international law, Field asserts that "[t]he several States are 
of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the ex-
clusion of power from all others.'m The view that personal jurisdiction in-
volves an allocation of sovereign authority is also consistent with how 
personal jurisdiction is approached internationally. Personal jurisdiction is 
the subject of international conventions18 and increasingly is viewed as fal-
ling "within the domain of customary internationallaw.''19 
The role of jurisdiction as a doctrine for allocating power among sov-
ereigns has been obscured by the Court's focus on the Due Process 
Clause-a clause that seems concerned with personal rights, not federalism 
or sovereignty.20 Pennoyer first introduced the Fourteenth Amendment, ex-
plaining that "the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, 
and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings 
in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of par-
ties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process 
oflaw."21 In other words, the Due Process Clause simply provides a vehicle 
15 95 U.S. 714 (1887). 
16 /d. at 722. 
17 !d. 
18 See. e.g., European Community Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 OJ. (L 012/2); Inter-American Con-
vention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments 
(signed at Montevideo on May 8, 1979), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/englishltreaties/b-
50.html; Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Oct. 1999), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html. The Hague Conference is discussed in Patrick 
Borchers, A Few Little Issues for the Hague Judgments Negotiations, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. !57 (1998); 
Friedrich Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. Ill (1998); Haines, supra 
note 2; Peter Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to Prepare a 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 24 BROOK. 1. INT'L L. 7 ( 1998). 
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 4, ch. 2, intro-
ductory n., at 304 (1987). 
20 Indeed, some have argued that, at least in the interstate context, personal jurisdiction ought more 
logically be situated in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., Robert Abrams & Paul Dimond, To-
ward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REv. 75 
(1984); Martin Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluaiion, 
75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1112, 1132 (1981); Roger Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Juris-
diction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849,880-84 (1989). 
21 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1887). 
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by which a defendant can attack the lack of jurisdiction.22 The role of the 
Due Process Clause is essentially "passivem3 and "derivative"24-it pro-
vides a vehicle for attacking exercises of jurisdiction that exceed a state's 
authority. 
Although both Pennoyer and World-Wide Volkswagen strongly support 
sovereignty as a central issue in personal jurisdiction, Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea25 can be read to retreat from 
this view. However, as others have persuasively argued, Bauxites can also 
be read simply to state a corollary of the Pennoyer approach-that the de-
fendant's due process right to be tried by a sovereign acting within the 
scope of its power is waivable. Under this interpretation, concerns about 
sovereignty remain central. As Professor Weisburb has argued: 
commencing a consideration of personal jurisdiction with a consideration of 
limitations on sovereignty is not merely appropriate, but necessary. All that 
Insurance Corp. adds is the caution that the personal jurisdiction rules deduced 
from sovereignty limitations do not touch the fundamentals of sovereignty so 
extensively that they cannot be waived.26 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that "sovereignty defines the 
scope of the due process test."27 
Of course, recognizing personal jurisdiction as a doctrine that allocates 
sovereign authority does not tell us what the rules for such allocation should 
be.Z8 In Pennoyer, the Court purports to derive the rules for allocating state 
sovereignty from its understanding that states are in many respects like in-
dependent countries.29 Similarly, World-Wide Volkswagen implies that the 
requirement of purposeful availment flows logically from our federal sys-
22 As Professor Stein has explained, Pennoyer's insight was that illegitimate authority constituted 
not only an offense against federalism and interstate comity, but also a violation of the defendant's due 
process right to fairness. See Stein, supra note 14, at 710 n.96. 
23 !d. at 693. 
24 Stephen Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1291, 1294 (1983). 
25 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
26 Arthur Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 414 
(1985). See Stein, supra note 14, at 712. 
27 Busch v. Buchman, II F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994). 
28 Professor von Mehren has described three principal theoretical accounts-relational, power, and 
instrumental-that have been used to explain allocations of government judicial authority. See ARTHUR 
VON MEHREN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY AUTHORJTY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DOCTRINE, POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF COMMON- AND CIVIL-
LAW SYSTEMS 30-36 (2003). Whatever the theory that is used to justify assertions of adjudicatory au-
thority, such authority is a form of government power. In a world of multiple sovereigns, a decision 
about which sovereign or sovereigns can exercise jurisdiction is fundamentally a decision about the allo-
cation of sovereign power. 
29 Of course, as others have noted, the Court also ignored important respects in which states are not 
like independent nations. See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 
1965 SUP. CT. REv. 241, 24~7. 
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tern and is an inevitable consequence of territorially based states.30 It 
clearly is not. The European Union is composed of territorially based coun-
tries, and it has allocated jurisdictional authority without reliance on the 
concept of purposeful contact.31 But regardless of whether the test that the 
Court has developed for allocating sovereign power among the states is in-
evitable or even sensible,32 it still reflects a view about how power ought to 
be divided. As Professor Werner has aptly put it, "[j]urisdiction is 
power."33 
B. Sovereignty and the Fifth Amendment 
Just as constitutional limits on the authority of states to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction reflect a view about the limits of state sovereignty, so too, 
any constitutional limit on the jurisdictional power of the United States 
courts should reflect a view about the limits of U.S. sovereignty.34 In con-
sidering the scope of U.S. sovereignty with respect to jurisdiction, most 
courts and commentators have assumed that the power of the United States 
vis-a-vis other nations is parallel to the power of states vis-a-vis each 
other.35 There is much discussion about whether contacts should be consid-
ered on a nationwide basis,36 but the largely unexamined assumption seems 
30 The Court explained that "we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant 
for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism 
embodied in the Constitution." Quoting from International Shoe, the Court stressed "that the reason-
ableness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must be assessed 'in the context of our federal sys-
tem of government."' World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,293-94 (1980). 
31 See infra text accompanying notes 42-56. 
32 See. e.g., Redish, supra note 20, at 1129-33 (arguing that the limitations the Court has imposed 
on state court jurisdiction are not implicit in our federal structure). 
33 Donal Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-
Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOK. L. REv. 565, 568 ( 1979) (emphasis in original). 
34 The Supreme Court has never decided what limits the Fifth Amendment might impose with re-
spect to personal jurisdiction. See Ornni Capitallnt'I, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 482 U.S. 97, 102-03 
n.5 (1987) (declining to decide whether "a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction, consistent 
with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation of the defendant's contacts with the Nation as a 
whole, rather than on its contacts with the State in which the federal court sits"); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. 
v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (finding "no occasion ... to determine whether Congress 
could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal 
jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts 
between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits"). 
35 One exception is Professor Abrams. See Robert Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimina-
tion of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. l (1982). 
36 See, e.g., Busch v. Buchman, II F.3d 1255, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1994); Go-Videa, Inc. v. Akai 
Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1989); Gary Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in 
International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. I, 37-42 (1987); Ronan Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, 
The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 
HASTINGS L.J. 799, 820-23 (1988); Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in 
the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1210-11 n.ll6 (1984). The other 
issue that the cases and commentators discuss is whether, in addition to requiring purposeful contacts, 
the Fifth Amendment also imposes a reasonableness requirement, but these cases do not question that 
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to be that the nature of the contacts required is the same for the nation as it 
is for the states.37 The assumption of parallel sovereignty does not with-
stand scrutiny. There is no reason to assume that the scope of legitimate ju-
dicial authority of the United States as it operates in the international 
community is essentially parallel to the scope of the authority of each of our 
individual states.38 States are situated within the United States quite differ-
ently than is the United States within the international community. First, all 
the states are governed by the same overriding Constitution. As a result, 
whatever the rules for personal jurisdiction, they are guaranteed to be recip-
rocal. Second, any judgment that complies with the rules must be en-
forced.39 The same is not true in the international arena. Countries 
sometimes assert broader jurisdiction for themselves than they will recog-
nize by other countries, 40 and there is no guarantee that any judgment will 
be enforced. 
In this environment, to what extent does the Constitution constrain 
U.S. exercises of sovereign judicial authority? I believe the constraints 
should be very modest and should not include the requirement of "purpose-
ful availment." In reaching this conclusion, I rely on two lines of authority: 
first, the scope of judicial jurisdiction as practiced by other nations and as 
recognized by international law, and second, the scope of United States pre-
scriptive jurisdiction. 
1. The Scope of Judicial Jurisdiction as Practiced by Other Nations 
and as Recognized in International Law.-In considering the constitution-
ally permissible scope of the judicial jurisdiction of U.S. courts, it is useful 
to understand the scope of authority that other countries assert for them-
selves and that international law generally accepts. We could, of course, 
read the Constitution to renounce forms of judicial jurisdiction that other 
there must be purposeful contacts. See, e.g., Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 
935, 945 (lith Cir. 1997); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1985). 
See generally Stanley Cox, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Aggregation of Contacts: The Real Minimum Con-
tacts and Federal Questions Raised by Ornni Capital, International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 42 ARK. L. 
REV. 211 (1989); Maryellan Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction, 79 
Nw. U. L. REv. I (1984). 
37 The failure to critically examine this assumption is in some respects quite understandable, given 
the origins of our doctrine. Pennoyer purports to rely on international law to determine the scope of 
state power. If states have the same power that nations have with respect to personal jurisdiction, then it 
may seem quite sensible to simply transfer the limitations imposed on states to the United States. How-
ever, as discussed below, some of the limits that we impose on states under the Fourteenth Amendment 
are, in important respects, more restrictive than the power asserted by other nations and apparently per-
mitted as a matter of international law. 38 See Hazard, supra note 29, at 246-47; Friedrich Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterrito-
riality?: A Comment on Professor Bri/mayer 's Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 42 (1987). 39 See U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ I. 
40 See Max Rheunstein, The Constitutional Basis of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 800 
(1955) ("(C]ountries frequently claim for themselves a scope of jurisdiction which is broader than that 
which other countries are willing to concede to them."). 
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countries legitimately claim for themselves (and indeed exercise over U.S. 
citizens), but as one commentator has argued in the context of prescriptive 
jurisdiction: 
to argue that the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment could impose 
general limitations upon U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction stricter than those re-
quired by customary international law is to argue that the Fifth Amendment 
denies to the United States a degree of authority recognized and asserted by 
most of the other nations of the world.41 
In looking at the jurisdictional practices of other countries, one discov-
ers that there is much commonality. For example, most countries permit ju-
risdiction on the basis of the defendant's domicile, as well as on the basis of 
transnationally related events occurring in the forum.42 What is noticeably 
absent from the jurisdictional rules of many countries is the requirement of 
purposeful availment. Instead, effects or harm within the country is gener-
ally sufficient.43 
Two cases involving the Internet dramatically illustrate that other 
countries do not require purposeful contacts. In the Yahoo! litigation, 
France asserted jurisdiction over U.S.-based Yahoo! for hosting a site on 
which Nazi memorabilia was offered for sale and which was accessible in · 
France.44 Although the court found that the harm in France was uninten-
tional, it nonetheless asserted jurisdiction.45 Similarly, Australia allowed ju-
risdiction against a U.S. company in a defamation case brought by an 
Australian plaintiff based on an article posted in Barron's Online.46 The 
41 A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNT'L L. 379,383 (1997). 
42 See REIMANN, supra note 3, at 75. 
43 For example, English law permits tort jurisdiction if the damage was sustained in England. See 
J .G. COLLIER, CONFLICT OF LAws 80 (3d ed. 2001 ). Australia similarly permits tort jurisdiction on the 
basis of effects within that country. See MICHAEL TILBURY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 
797 (2002); see also RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 176 (4th ed. 
2000) (Japan allows jurisdiction in "a place of tort."). Similarly, the Restatement, which purports to set 
forth "some international rules and guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate in cases hav-
ing international implications," RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES pt. 4, ch. 2, introductory n., at 304 (1987), does not require the equivalent of purposeful avail-
ment. Instead, it would permit jurisdiction on the basis of effects within the state, provided those effects 
are "substantial, direct, and foreseeable." !d. § 421 (2)(j). The Restatement does not elaborate on the 
meaning of this phrase, though to the extent the Restatement is intended to be a statement about current 
customary international law, this phrase must be understood against the backdrop of common practice. 
As the EU's approach to consumer transactions in the e-cornmerce arena suggests, a harm to a consumer 
seems to be treated as a sufficient effect without much inquiry into the foreseeability of the harm. 
44 See UEJF v. Yahoo!, Inc., T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, No. RG 00/05308, available at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/conflicts/frenchorder.pdf (English translation of court order). 
45 See Denis Rice & Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in Determining Personal Ju-
risdiction in Cyberspace, 58 Bus. LAW. 601,649 (2003). 
46 See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (Dec. 10, 2002), available at 
http :1/www .austl ii.edu.au/au/ cases/cthlhigh _ ct/2002/56.html. 
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court held that harm to the plaintiffs reputation was suffered in Australia 
and that this was a sufficient basis for jurisdiction in Australia. 
The regulation that controls jurisdiction among the member nations of 
the European Union (EU) provides another useful example.47 That regula-
tion does not require purposeful contacts; tort claims can be brought "in the 
place of the harm."48 The regulation also provides that in cases of multiple 
defendants there is jurisdiction where any one defendant is domiciled,49 and 
further that there is jurisdiction over third party defendants.50 There is no 
requirement that these additional defendants have any contacts with the fo-
rum. 
The EU regulation also illustrates that other countries are willing to 
balance the relative situation of the plaintiffs and defendants, rather than fo-
cusing exclusively on protecting the defendant.51 Thus, the EU allows 
claims for maintenance and child support to be brought in the domicile of 
the maintenance creditor2-a result that is at odds with the Court's holding 
in Kulko. 53 Similarly, the EU allows consumers to sue businesses in the 
consumer's home country, provided the business does any commercial ac-
tivity in the consumer's country or "by any means, directs such activities 
to" the consumer's home country.54 Offering goods and services for sale 
via an interactive website accessible in the consumer's domicile may be a 
sufficient connection to permit the business to be sued in the consumer's 
home. 55 This approach has been criticized within Europe, but the criticism 
has focused not on the theoretical need for purposeful contacts, but instead 
on the relative merits of a pro-consumer versus a pro-business regulatory 
regime from a policy perspective. 56 
47 See Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Maters, 2001 O.J. (L 012) I [hereinafter EC Regulation]. For a discussion of the scope of 
the Brussels Convention, the precursor to the Brussels Regulation, see Patrick Borchers, Comparing 
Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: Lessons for American Re-
form, 40 AM. J. COM. L. 127-33 (1992); Juenger, supra note 36, at 1205-11; Linda Silberman, Judicial 
Jurisdiction in the Conflict of Laws Course: Adding a Comparative Dimension, 28 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 400-05 (1995). 
48 EC Regulation, supra note 47, art. 5(3). The place of the harm is limited to "direct" harm, and 
this has generated what one commentator called "some microscopic debate" over what exactly would 
constitute a direct harm. See Borchers, supra note 47, at 146. 
49 EC Regulation, supra note 47, art. 6(1). 
50 !d. art. 6(2). This approach is at odds with the Court's holding in Asahi. 
51 See REIMANN, supra note 3, at 81-82. 
52 EC Regulation, supra note 47, art. 5(2). 
53 See Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
54 EC Regulation, supra note 47, art. 15. 
55 See European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on Jurisdiction, COM (1999) 348 of 14 July 1999, at 16; Opinion of the Economic and Social Commit-
tee on the Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, CES 233/2000-99/1054 CNS, March 2000, at 7-8. 
56 See Haines, supra note 2, at 176-78. 
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One final observation about jurisdiction in other countries: there is a 
long history of aggressive assertions of jurisdiction and retaliation. 57 Article 
14 of the French Civil Code grants French courts jurisdiction over all dis-
putes in which the plaintiff is French, regardless of whether the defendant 
or the dispute has any connection with France. 58 A number of countries al-
low "assets" jurisdiction under which a court acquires in personam jurisdic-
tion, allowing judgments of any size based on the presence of property. 59 
Finally, some courts assert "retaliatory" jurisdiction.6° For example, domi-
ciliaries of Belgium can sue in Belgian courts ifthe foreigner's home coun-
try would assert jurisdiction over a Belgium citizen in a similar 
circumstance.61 These more aggressive jurisdictional bases are now prohib-
ited within the European Union;62 however, the prohibition extends only to 
member countries exercising jurisdiction over citizens of other member 
countries. Thus, United States citizens are subject to these more aggressive 
jurisdictional bases. 63 
This brief survey highlights several important points. First, there is no 
reason to believe that the requirement of purposeful contacts is inherent in 
territorially-based states. Territorially-based states around the world exist 
and co-exist without using this test. Second, many other countries assert ju-
risdiction over U.S. citizens as well as others without requiring purposeful 
availment. These countries may require some nexus between the parties or 
the dispute and the forum. However, the nexus is not nearly as demanding 
as our Fourteenth Amendment test of purposeful availment and does not re-
quire "targeting."64 Instead, it seems generally sufficient that there are ef-
57 See Juenger, supra note 36, at 1204; Kurt Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in XXTH 
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTSLAWS: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 330, 
330--31 (K. Nadelmann eta!. eds., 1961). 
58 French Civil Code art. 14; see Born, supra note 36, at 14; Juenger, supra note 36, at 1204. 
59 See Born, supra note 36, at 14. One commentator explained that "a Russian may leave his ga-
loshes in a hotel in Berlin and may be sued in Berlin for a debt of 100,000 Mark because of 'presence of 
assets within the jurisdiction."' Nadelmann, supra note 57, at 329. 
60 See Born, supra note 36, at 15; Nadelmann, supra note 57, at 330--31. 
61 See Born, supra note 36, at 15. 
62 See EC Regulation, supra note 47, art. 3(2) & annex I. 
63 It should be noted that other countries disapprove of some forms of personal jurisdiction that 
states have been permitted to exercise under the Fourteenth Amendment, notably tag jurisdiction and 
general doing business jurisdiction. Some have argued that such forms of jurisdiction violate interna-
tional law and that states therefore ought not be permitted to exercise them. See Russell Weintraub, An 
Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 611 (1991). The Supreme Court 
has not had occasion to decide whether the exercise of tag jurisdiction might unduly interfere with the 
exercise of foreign relations. This Article does not take a position on whether state power ought to be 
constrained in this regard. See Stein, supra note 14, at 739-40 n.220. Nonetheless, whatever power 
states have to exercise these forms of jurisdiction against aliens, the federal government surely has that 
much power as well. 
64 See, e.g., Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262-Q3 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
123 S. Ct. 2092 (2003); Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 2, 8-9 (Cal. 2002). One article has referred to 
cases requiring targeting as a "strict effect test" and distinguished this from a "soft effects test," which 
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fects within the forum that are at least reasonably direct and not completely 
unforeseeable. The question therefore is whether our Constitution re-
nounces for the U.S. government an element of sovereignty asserted by 
other countries and generally accepted as a matter of customary interna-
tional law. I think we should be reluctant to read such a renunciation into 
the vague language ofthe Due Process Clause. 
Some have argued that the purposeful availment requirement reflects a 
core commitment to "limited sovereignty"65 and consent as the only legiti-
mate bases for asserting government authority.66 There are several difficul-
ties with this argument. First, in cases involving non-voluntary transactions 
such as torts, the "consent" is entirely hypothetical and, as Professor Bril-
mayer has observed, "theories of tacit consent almost always assume ex-
actly what they set out to prove."67 Second, it is not at all clear that a 
general commitment to a theory of political consent necessarily leads to 
"purposeful availment."68 For example, Professor Richard Epstein, who has 
argued that "the consent principle neatly explains the dynamics of many of 
our jurisdictional doctrines,"69 has also argued that in the ordinary tort case, 
the victim should be able to sue in the place where the harm occurred.70 
The problems of consent theory are compounded in the international 
context. There is an odd circularity to arguing that the reason an alien is 
protected from jurisdiction by our Constitution is because she has not done 
anything to accept the legitimacy of that Constitution. As Professor Weis-
burd has observed, 
aliens overseas may engage in behavior that harms the interests of the United 
States but not those of their own communities. To hold such aliens beyond the 
reach of American law by reason of their rights under the Fifth Amendment 
would allow them to enjoy the benefits of the Constitution while avoiding the 
burdens imposed on the American community by their behavior. 71 
simply requires effects. Rice & Gladstone, supra note 45, at 608-13; see also Michael Geist, Is There a 
There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345 
(2001) (advocating a "targeting" test). Rice and Gladstone argue that a "soft effects test" goes beyond 
what the Supreme Court has allowed. Rice & Gladstone, supra note 45, at 613. In this Article, I am ar-
guing that the Fifth Amendment should be construed to allow jurisdiction on the basis of a "soft effects 
test." 
65 Cox, supra note 36. 
66 See, e.g., Margaret Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 5, 19 
(1989); Trangsrud, supra note 20, at 884-85. 
67 Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1304 (1989). See Gott-
lieb, supra note 24, at 130 I ("[I]mplied consent ... is inherently circular."). 
68 For a discussion of some of the difficulties with tacit consent as it relates to personal jurisdiction, 
see Wendy Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REv. 529, 536-46 
(1991 ). 
69 Richard Epstein, Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. I, 2. 
70 See id. at 30-31. 
71 Weisburd, supra note 41, at 425. There is another problem with the argument that our Constitu-
tion embodies a core commitment to limited sovereignty and jurisdiction only by consent when dealing 
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2. Lessons from Prescriptive Jurisdiction.-Judicial jurisdiction 
concerns the authority of a sovereign to adjudicate a dispute. A closely re-
lated issue is prescriptive jurisdiction-that is, the authority of a sovereign 
to apply its laws to a dispute. In the interstate context, the Supreme Court 
has relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to im-
pose limits on state prescriptive jurisdiction, just as it has used that clause to 
impose limits on state judicial jurisdiction.72 Thus, in considering the limits 
that the Fifth Amendment imposes on judicial jurisdiction, it is useful to 
consider the parallel question of what limits it imposes on prescriptive ju-
risdiction. 
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the extent to which the Fifth 
Amendment limits Congress's prescriptive jurisdiction. Indeed, there is a 
debate in the literature as to whether the Fifth Amendment imposes any 
constraints on prescriptive jurisdiction.73 However, the cases and commen-
taries on the constitutional scope of prescriptive jurisdiction offer several 
important lessons. First, although there is an extensive case law concerning 
the Fourteenth Amendment limits on state prescriptive jurisdiction,74 courts 
that have considered the Fifth Amendment limits tend not to cite or rely on 
the Fourteenth Amendment cases. 75 This at least suggests that, with respect 
to prescriptive jurisdiction, courts do not view federal power as equivalent 
to state power. 
Second, the Fifth Amendment limits on prescriptive jurisdiction appear 
to be quite modest, if any exist at all. As noted earlier, some courts and 
commentators have found that the Fifth Amendment imposes no limits. 76 
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Fifth Amendment requires "a sufficient 
nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such application 
with outsiders; this supposed core principle is inconsistent with much that the Constitution clearly per-
mits. Most dramatically, the Constitution permits wars and conquest of Native Americans without the 
consent of the affected people. See id. at 405-06. Less dramatically, as the next subsection highlights, 
the U.S. has regularly exercised prescriptive jurisdiction without a showing of anything resembling pur-
poseful availment in the choice of law arena. Thus, the claim that the Constitution extends U.S. sover-
eignty only to those who have "consented" is at best overstated. 
72 The tests for prescriptive and judicial jurisdiction are not the same. Indeed, the test for prescrip-
tive jurisdiction is less restrictive than that for judicial jurisdiction. This has led one commentator to 
quip that it seems as if the Court thinks "an accused is more concerned with where he will be hanged 
than whether." Linda Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 88 
(1978). 
73 Compare Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due 
Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment does impose limits), with 
Weisburd, supra note 41. 
74 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 
U.S. 302 (1981); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
75 See generally Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 73, at 1228-33 (noting the failure of courts to rely 
on these cases). 
76 See United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 
993 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1993); Weisburd, supra note 41. 
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[of U.S. law] would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair."77 This may 
mean, as Professor Born has noted, that the Fifth Amendment "might pre-
clude extension of federal law to conduct abroad that has only de minimus 
contact with or effect upon the United· States or its nationals,"78 but effects 
within the United States would seem to meet that minimum requirement. 
Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations allows prescriptive ju-
risdiction on the basis of "substantial effect[s]" without any showing of 
purposeful availment. 79 
Third, the limitations imposed by the Fifth Amendment on judicial ju-
risdiction ought not to be significantly more demanding than those imposed 
on prescriptive jurisdiction. In the Fourteenth Amendment context, the 
Court has imposed significantly different standards for choice of law than it 
has for jurisdiction. Whatever the justifications for this in the interstate 
context,80 the international arena presents quite a different situation. If a 
state or country has prescriptive but not judicial jurisdiction, then of neces-
sity it must rely on the courts of other states or countries for its policies to 
be vindicated. This is far less problematic in the interstate context than in 
the international one,81 because states, unlike other countries, have some ob-
ligations not to treat the laws of other states with hostilityY More impor-
tantly, the fundamental differences among the substantive policies of the 
states are far fewer than among nations. In the Yahoo! case, France would 
probably not have found it a satisfactory solution to rely on U.S. courts to 
enforce French lawsY Not surprisingly, in international law, jurisdiction to 
adjudicate has traditionally been treated "as ancillary to jurisdiction to pre-
77 See United States v. David, 905 F.2d 245, 24~9 (9th Cir. 1990). Interestingly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit also held that no nexus is required with respect to activities on a stateless vessel of the high seas be-
cause "any nation may assert jurisdiction over stateless vessels." United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 
967 (9th Cir. 1995). 
78 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 513 {3d ed. 1996). 
79 RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402( I)( c) { 1987). 
Moreover, as Professor Born has noted, "neither the due process clause nor other constitutional provi-
sions have in fact imposed significant constraints on the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law." BORN, supra 
note 78, at 513. 
80 The Court's approach to the Fourteenth Amendment has been criticized in this regard. See, e.g., 
Harold Maier & Thomas McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 
AM. J. COMP. L. 249,266-71 (1991); Perdue, supra note 68, at 570--73. 
81 See Haines, supra note 2, at 188 n.105 (noting that it is generally "not considered to be a good idea 
to set up a private international law framework in which courts are regularly required to apply foreign law, 
since judges will inevitably be dealing with a system of law they are unlikely to be familiar with and will 
presumably make more mistakes in its application"). The author makes this observation in the context of 
discussing international agreements that might call for this arrangement. It seems even less desirable to ex-
pect nations to rely on other nations to apply their law in the absence of some agreement or convention. 
82 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of 
Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, I 06 YALE L.J. 1965, 1986-90 {1997). 
83 Indeed, a federal court in California declared the French judgment unenforceable in the U.S. Ya-
hoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
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scribe."84 Similarly, the Fifth Amendment ought to be understood to allow 
personal jurisdiction to the extent Congress has the power to prescribe U.S. 
law. 
II. WHAT ABOUT CONVENIENCE AND REASONABLENESS? 
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court observes that the limitations on 
personal jurisdiction perform two distinct functions. One is allocating sov-
ereignty among the states of our federal system, which I have already dis-
cussed. The other is "protect[ing] the defendant against the burdens of 
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum." Even if the "sovereignty" 
component of the Fifth Amendment is understood to be quite different than 
that component of the Fourteenth Amendment, one might argue that the in-
convenience components of the two amendments are essentially equiva-
lent. 85 However, I believe that, at least in the Fifth Amendment context, 
concerns about convenience and reasonableness should be addressed at the 
subconstitutionallevel of venue and forum non conveniens. 
In determining what role convenience and reasonableness play under 
the Fifth Amendment, it is important to remember that, even within the 
Fourteenth Amendment context, the Court has not found a general right to 
avoid inconvenience. In both Burger Kin~6 and Asahi,87 the Court makes 
clear that concerns about inconvenience are only one aspect of a broader in-
quiry about fairness. As the Court observed in Asahi: "A court must con-
sider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the 
plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief."88 Both burdens and state interest 
must be analyzed differently in the international context than in the inter-
state context. 
First, although the burdens on the defendant may be great, so are the 
burdens on the plaintiff if jurisdiction is denied.89 As one court has ob-
served, "many of the inconvenience[s in international litigation] are sym-
metrical."90 By protecting a foreign defendant from "the unique burdens 
84 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 4, ch. 2, introduc-
tory n., at 304. 85 As with the contacts prong, the Supreme Court has not determined the extent to which fairness or 
convenience are factors under the Fifth Amendment. The lower courts are split on the issue, with some 
suggesting that the Fifth Amendment is satisfied provided there are contacts with the U.S., e.g., Busch v. 
Buchman, II F.3d 1255, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1994); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 
1979), and others suggesting that a further fairness or convenience inquiry is required, e.g., Republic of 
Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945 (I Ith Cir. 1997); Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 97 F.3d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 1996). 
86 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,477 (1985). 
87 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). 
88 !d. 
89 See Born, supra note 36, at 25. 90 Ins. Co. ofN. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system,"91 we 
may consign the U.S. plaintiff to enduring those burdens. Second, the "in-
terests of the forum" (i.e., the interests of the United States) should be given 
great weight in the international context. As one treatise has observed, 
where Congress has chosen to assert broad jurisdiction, the "statute should 
be afforded substantial weight as a legislative articulation of federal social 
policy."92 
General concerns about convenience and reasonableness can be ad-
dressed at the subconstitutional level using the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. Under this doctrine, the court can take into account both public 
and private interests93 and can assure that the plaintiff will in fact have an 
alternative forum. As Professors Degnan and Kane have argued: 
Adjusting for fairness by use of forum non conveniens also has important prac-
tical advantages. First, the Supreme Court has had occasion recently to refine 
its standards for forum non conveniens in the international setting so there ex-
ists well-developed doctrine allowing for easy application. Second, it places 
convenience concerns in their proper perspective, keeping separate questions 
of sovereign power from those of whether, in light of all the circumstances 
presented, jurisdiction should be declined and the parties remitted to some 
other forum to settle their dispute. Third, forum non conveniens offers the 
added possibility that the court can adjust for potential inequities between par-
ties by using conditional dismissals-a device not available under the "black-
or-white" approach to jurisdiction.94 
Finally, I note that international law does not appear to require a conven-
ience or open-ended "reasonableness" inquiry.95 The Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations indicates that jurisdiction is appropriate "if the relationship 
of the state to the person or thing is such as to make the exercise of jurisdic-
tion reasonable.'><J6 However, the section goes on to provide that where there 
is a "substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect" in the state, then jurisdiction 
will generally be reasonable.97 As the earlier discussion indicates, other coun-
tries do not appear to engage in an open-ended "reasonableness" inquiry, but 
instead assert jurisdiction where there is some nexus such as effects. Once 
91 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. 
92 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 1068.1, 
at 625 (2002). 
93 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-{)9 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 
U.S. 235,241 (1981). 
94 Degnan & Kane, supra note 36, at 819. 
95 Professor Silberman has observed: "I do not think that any fair reading of jurisdictional law in 
the member states of the European Union or of the Brussels Convention establishes anything like the 
amorphous reasonableness standard that has been elevated to constitutional principle by the United 
States Supreme Court." Silberman, supra note 47, at 396. 
96 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421(1) 
(1987). 
97 !d. § 421 (2). 
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again, we should pause before concluding that our government is constitu-
tionally disabled from asserting jurisdiction over foreigners under circum-
stances in which other countries consider it entirely appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that it is constitutional under the Fifth Amendment 
for U.S. courts to assert personal jurisdiction solely on the basis of effects in 
the U.S., without any requirement of "purposeful availment."98 Under this 
approach, where authorized by Congress, it would be constitutional for U.S. 
courts to assert jurisdiction over an alien defendant who had posted material 
on the Internet that caused harm in the United States. The Fifth Amend-
ment would also permit jurisdiction against cybersquatters whose domain 
names caused harm here.99 
This Article takes no position on whether Congress ought to assert ju-
risdiction to the full extent permitted by the Fifth Amendment. There may 
be good reasons for restraint. Nonetheless, I believe that the Constitution 
gives Congress the power to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts to 
protect U.S. interests from harmful effects in the U.S. caused by foreigners 
acting abroad. One might object that a more expansive view ofpersonalju-
98 At least one court has suggested that effects alone may be sufficient under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997). However, I agree with 
the courts and commentators who have concluded that this misreads the Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., 
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2092 
(2003); Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 2, 8-9 (Cal. 2002); Redish, supra note 5, at 596-600. My ar-
gument here is that regardless of what the Court ultimately concluded with respect to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, effects alone should be sufficient under the Fifth Amendment. 
99 The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act authorizes in rem jurisdiction in some circum-
stances, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(2) (West Supp. 2003), and there has been much discussion about the 
constitutionality of this aspect of the Act. See, e.g., Andrew Grotto, Due Process and In Rem Jurisdic-
tion under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. I (2001); 
Thomas Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97 (2000); Catherine Struve & R. 
Polk Wagner, Rea/space Sovereigns in Cyberspace: Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989 (2002). Since cybersquatting is likely to cause effects in 
the U.S. (at least to U.S. plaintiffs), there would likely be in personam jurisdiction over cybersquatters, 
see Jason W. Callen, Comment, Asserting in Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Cybersquatters, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 1837, 1860-61 (2002); therefore, it is not necessary to resolve the extent to which Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), applies to the Fifth Amendment. I note, however, that jurisdiction by 
attachment is widely used by other countries. See Nadelmann, supra note 57, at 324-26; Michael Ake-
hurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L 145, 171-72 (1972-73). As Professor 
Nadelmann observes, "It seems that this possibility of proceeding against the absent debtor with assets 
within reach has always been considered normal." Nadelmann, supra note 57, at 324-25. Even theRe-
statement (rhird) allows jurisdiction based on the presence of property, though "only in respect of a 
claim reasonably connected with" the property. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 421 (2)(k). In light of this wide practice, even if there were no in personam 
jurisdiction, one might conclude that in rem jurisdiction is permissible under the Fifth Amendment. In-
terestingly, Germany has apparently concluded that for jurisdictional purposes, domain names ending in 
".de" have a situs in Germany. See Ray August, International Cyberjurisdiction: A Comparative 
Analysis, 39 AM. Bus. L. J. 531, 559-60 (2002). 
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risdiction is inconsistent with language by the Supreme Court that has cau-
tioned restraint when jurisdiction over foreigners is involved. 100 As the 
Court observed in Asahi: "Great care and reserve should be exercised when 
extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field. "101 
While caution may be appropriate with respect to permissible exercises of 
state jurisdiction, 102 the situation with respect to federal power is quite dif-
ferent. It would be an odd deference to the federal foreign affairs power for 
the Court to constitutionally disable Congress from asserting jurisdiction to 
the full extent that other nations do. 103 
The argument I am presenting here is not that alien defendants are out-
side the protection of the Fifth Amendment. I assume that alien defendants, 
like all defendants, have the right to notice and the other procedural due 
process protections covered by the Fifth Amendment. Similarly, I assume 
that alien defendants, like all defendants, have the right to be tried by a 
competent tribunal, that is, a tribunal that is acting within the scope of its 
sovereign authority. This, of course, begs the question of what is the scope 
of the United States's sovereign authority? In determining the scope of 
United States authority, the limitations we have developed for the states are 
poor analogues. Indeed, I think one might reasonably conclude that with 
respect to the questions of allocation of sovereign authority between the 
United States and other nations, the Constitution does not constrain at all. 
There has been debate about this point in the context of prescriptive juris-
diction and little clear judicial guidance. But for purposes of addressing 
many of the jurisdictional problems raised in the Internet context, we need 
not fully resolve whether the Fifth Amendment constrains at all. It will be 
sufficient that the United States can exercise jurisdiction on the basis of ef-
fects-as other countries do and international law would permit. 
100 See Born, supra note 36, at 2-27. 
101 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (quoting United States v. First 
Nat' I City Bank, 379 U.S. 378,401 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). In Asahi, the Court also stated that 
it was appropriate to take into account "the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose 
interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by the California court." 480 U.S. at 115. In the 
Fifth Amendment context, the concern about properly considering the policies of other nations should at 
most be a rule of statutory construction, rather than a constitutional mandate that would override the 
judgment of the political branches. Cf EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991) (noting 
that in the context of legislative authority, "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is 
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States" (emphasis added)). 
102 See Born, supra note 36, at 27-33. 
103 Professor Born argues that "equally rigorous scrutiny is generally called for when federal courts 
assert jurisdiction over foreign entities." !d. at 34. However, he notes that where Congress has in fact 
acted, this "obviates the need for concern about judicial interference with foreign relations." !d. at 34 
n.l41; see also Struve & Wagner, supra note 99, at 1005 n.64 ("Where Congress has enacted legislation 
authorizing suit against a foreign cybersquatter, a federal court's assertion of jurisdiction may be less 
open to question because the concern of state interference with federal foreign policy does not exist."). 
471 
